I. INTRODUCTION
Taxes have become the lifeblood of modern society and epitomize the power of the collective over the desires of the individual. When a group of people comes together and joins a society, it surrenders some individual rights and desires for the greater good. For the desires of the collective to be effectuated, there needs to be a physical representation of that collective will. As the physical manifestation of the collective will comes together it requires a collection from the individuals to effectuate the needs of the many, and this is the basis of taxation. However, because the physical manifestation of the collective will requires an individual to sacrifice the fruits of her labor, there is an inherent conflict between the individual and society as a whole.
2 This conflict between the individual and society boils down to basic human nature 3 and is at the root of any discussion regarding tax avoidance.
Tax collection by the government and tax avoidance by citizens are manifestations of the desires of the individual conflicting with the needs of the collective. In the United States, tax avoidance is a zero-sum game 4 between the taxpayer and the United States with the deck stacked heavily in favor of the government. 5 An apt metaphor for the interactions between the * Sean Deneault is a 2014 graduate of Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. I would like to thank my wife Mindy for her help and support. I would also like to thank the staff of the Indiana International and Comparative Law Review for their editing work and helpful suggestions throughout the process.
1. Selected Tax Quotes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes (last updated Mar. 27, 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/J4CY-X9XC).
2. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (Individuals are rational wealth maximizers, and resist being placed into the will of a group unless there is an external force compelling them.).
3. See id. (stating that individuals seek out the best result for themselves, and do not concern themselves with a group unless compelled).
4. A "zero-sum game" is a game in which the cumulative winnings equal the cumulative losses. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1376 (10th ed. 1994).
5. The principal tool used by the government is the withholding system in which an employer or other income source withholds a portion of income to be paid to the IRS on the individual's behalf. Tax Withholding, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/individuals/employees/tax-withholding (last updated Dec. 2, 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/84A4-KYF3); see also I.R.S. Pub. 505 (2012).
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[Vol. 24:3 government and taxpayers is a game of poker. In this game, the United States is the "house" or the player with large resources who uses its large resources to cripple the opposing players. The taxpayers' approach to this game will vary based on their individual risk tolerance levels. The less risky players will devise capitulating strategies designed to control their losses, recognizing that the odds are too great for them to attempt anything else. The risk-takers however, will employ elaborate bluff strategies designed to minimize the amount of tax they must pay. In order to play poker effectively, you are trained to play your opponent, not your cards. 6 And for the past several decades, individuals with the right mix of resources and risk tolerance have recognized a way to beat the house: offshore accounts. 7 Offshore bank accounts designed to conceal assets from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have been a thorn in the side of the US tax system for quite some time. 8 To continue the poker metaphor, by "stashing" some money off of the playing table, individuals are able to safeguard their assets by keeping them out of the game altogether. By keeping this money off the table, the taxpayers are bluffing the government, tricking it into believing that the taxpayers are capitulating and merely trying to limit their losses. Individuals have used this method of bluffing effectively, with some estimates claiming between $40 and $70 billion of tax revenue are lost each year. 9 The US Government has been unable to go after these evaders primarily because of the incompatibility of the domestic taxation system to the international realm. 10 The domestic taxation system, or the game upon the poker table, works because it compels a majority of employers to enter into tax withholding and reporting requirements which force all the chips on the table. 11 In the international realm, withholding systems do not have the same effect, 12 and thus the risk assessment for those with international accounts has not been strong enough to compel compliance.
Over the past several years, the US Government has taken action to close this loophole 13 and force the risk-taking taxpayers to bring all their 
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assets to the table. A major part of this push to action has been due to the increasing public awareness of the severity of the tax avoidance problem from several high profile events such as the prosecution against the Swiss bank UBS. 14 With $104 million rewarded to whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld, 15 increased media attention on offshore tax evasion led to a heightened public awareness of its severity. 16 Even the 2012 presidential election was not immune to discussions of offshore tax avoidance, as Mitt Romney was questioned repeatedly about his bank accounts in foreign countries. 17 Coupled with the increase in media interest, the economic climate has made the idea of closing the loophole political gold. In the middle part of the last decade, Senator Levin and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs have held several hearings regarding tax havens 18 and brought light to the severity of the problem. The often-quoted statistic from these hearings was that the United States loses $100 billion in tax revenue each year. 19 With the federal debt standing more than $17 trillion as 20 an additional $100 billion in annual revenue is an appealing avenue for politicians to pursue. 21 In addition, many Americans have become increasingly upset with the perceived leniency towards wealthy individuals by the federal government. 22 Between the growing public awareness, difficult economic climate, and the stigma of the "one percent," the political climate was ripe for a change in how the government deals with offshore tax shelters.
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was passed as part of the 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE), and added four new sections to Chapter 4 of the Internal Revenue Code. 23 The basic idea of FATCA is to create an information disclosure system for foreign banks to disclose the account information of US clients. 24 To compel banks to enter into this system, FATCA threatens mandatory 30 percent withholding on certain "withholdable payments" made to, or in some circumstances by, financial institutions.
25 These "withholdable payments" include all interest, dividends, and gross proceeds from US sources, 26 so even foreign individuals will be affected, for "as soon as you invest in the US, you are in [the regulation's] scope."
27
While the decision to implement such a draconian structure is understandable given the background within which FATCA was created, 28 the system itself has some questionable implications. There are potential negative impacts upon the US capital markets and international relations which could have a severe detrimental effect upon the country. 
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Furthermore, when the system is examined in conjunction with the individuals it seeks to capture, there arise several concerns as to its potential effectiveness. 29 With the fervor surrounding the role of the upper classes in the 2008 financial crisis, it is important that this system be thoroughly examined and analyzed with a detachment from its political undertones. By taking the system for what it is and working it through to its logical conclusion, we will be able to determine whether its benefits outweigh its costs.
II. ISSUES
1. This Note begins by illustrating the progression of the international tax collection efforts. The first type of effort examined is the use of bilateral tax treaties, which have been the primary means of reigning in offshore tax evasion since World War II. Regarding the second type of effort, the Note examines the recent developments of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) "blacklisting" and multinational pronouncements.
2. Next, the Note examines the development of FATCA, how it works, and what effects should be anticipated.
3. This Note then discusses the domestic voluntary tax compliance system employed by the United States and how FATCA is attempting to replicate such a system for the very different international realm.
4. The Note then turns to the potential negative effects of FATCA on international relations and the US capital and investment markets.
5. Finally the Note argues that due to the overwhelming negative effects of FATCA, and the type of person who still holds offshore accounts, the US Government should instead attempt a more enticing approach to regain some of the lost tax revenue. By using the "carrot" instead of the "stick," the United States will have greater success in gaining back tax revenue lost in overseas accounts. 31 In order to understand why FATCA developed into such a strenuous regulatory regime, 32 we must begin by examining the previous inadequate attempts to regulate offshore accounts. The foundations of international tax regulation began with bilateral treaties.
III. HISTORY/DEVELOPMENT

A. Development of International Tax Collection Efforts
Bilateral Treaties
US laws on offshore accounts have been around since the post-World War II era 33 but did not focus on tax evasion until much later. 34 Similar to the development of international law in general, the regulation of offshore accounts began with the promulgation of bilateral treaties. 35 By their very nature, bilateral treaties are as effective as the two countries want them to be. 36 The often voluntary nature of bilateral treaty negotiations can lead to a severe limitation in the scope of the treaty's application.
One of the historic problems with the implementation of an international legal structure is the conflict with domestic sovereignty. 37 As separate sovereign entities, when countries negotiate with each other they are often reluctant to surrender any of that sovereignty, 38 even if it effectuates a mutually beneficial outcome. 39 In the realm of international tax avoidance, the element of sovereignty that has caused the greatest problem in effectuating binding obligations is banking privacy law. 40 privacy laws vary from country to country, but in general they prevent banks from disclosing information about their customers in all but very limited circumstances. 41 As the basic goal of US tax regulators is to gain information about accounts held by citizens in a foreign country, 42 it is understandable how strong banking privacy laws can severely hinder those attempts. Perhaps the most significant bearings on successful treaties are whether or not the other country is also concerned about offshore tax evasion, 43 and if it is vulnerable to US influence. Some countries, like the United Kingdom, are so similar to the United States that their domestic interests in preventing tax avoidance are often aligned, yielding an effective treaty. 44 Often containing well-developed economies, these countries utilize similar taxation philosophy, 45 and are also concerned with taxpayers' attempts to avoid taxation. 46 Because these countries are similar to the United States in terms of taxation methods, 47 it follows that they are concerned with tax avoidance themselves, and thus are amenable to entering into more strenuous and effective bilateral treaties. 48 As a result of the similarities between these countries and the United States, 49 their treaties often reflect a shared desire to curb tax avoidance, resulting in effective agreements. 53 This influx of foreign capital creates a powerful industry that carries significant weight in policy decisions due to the significant impact of the industry upon the country's economy. This gives the politicians of the country little incentive to align their interests with the United States, which would require them to go against their domestic interests. 54 These countries are so reliant upon these capital markets that it is likely that no amount of regulation short of a world-wide multinational taxation system will compel their compliance. 55 Similar to the countries described in the preceding paragraph, Switzerland also has domestic interests that have historically clashed with the interests of the United States and have led to several inadequate treaties. 56 Because Switzerland is a more significant player on the international stage and has a more storied banking history, it has developed over the years as one of the preeminent offshore tax havens. 57 Because of this, Switzerland is the perfect example to evaluate the development of bilateral treaties between the United States and a country with a strong interest in banking privacy laws.
Swiss banking privacy laws developed in response to the threat of Nazi Germany executing German citizens who did not disclose assets held outside of Germany. 58 The Swiss passed legislation establishing specific duties for bankers and criminalized the disclosure of information in order to protect the national sovereignty of the Swiss economy as well as the assets of bank customers. 59 These strong laws and the country's historical economic stability 60 helped Switzerland become a premier banking center, which to this day remains an important part of its economy. 
2014] FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT 737
The post-World War II world marked a turning point in international affairs. After the wars, the development of multinational organizations and technology connected the world more than ever before. In the realm of taxation, the post-war period also made it easier for individuals to hide money in different countries. 62 The recognition of this problem led to the development of the first bilateral tax treaties between the United States and other countries. 63 The 1951 convention between the United States and Switzerland focused mainly on setting up a system that prevented double taxation. 64 While the system set up the exchange of information, it was only for information "as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention or for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation to the taxes which are subject of the present Convention." 65 Without defining "fraud or the like" 66 and by leaving the specifics of information exchange up in the air, 67 the convention was not constructed to deal with tax evasion as much as it set up a framework for dealing with double taxation.
68
With the changing tax laws 69 and growing public awareness 70 towards the end of the last century, the treaties began to change. 71 In the case of the treaty between Switzerland and the United States, the treaty has been amended three times since the mid-1990s. 72 The first change resulted in a whole new convention in 1996, 73 76 The provisions relating to the exchange of information were praised as expanding the scope of information exchanged by allowing US authorities to access bank information in cases of tax fraud. 77 The protocol of the Convention defines "tax fraud" as "fraudulent conduct that causes or is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of the tax paid to a 'l 1983, 1991-92 (1996) ).
81. In Switzerland, tax fraud is defined very narrowly and can be achieved one of two ways: either by using falsified documents (other than the tax return) to deceive, or without those documents, by willfully deceiving to evade taxes. Jense, supra note 30, at 1833. Without meeting either of these standards, the conduct will fall short of "tax fraud" under Swiss domestic law, and thus forecloses one of the two-pronged approaches. Jense, supra note 30, at 1833. Furthermore, the 1996 Convention provides that no "trade, business, industrial or professional secret" may be disclosed, and because in Switzerland banking privacy is considered a professional secret it does not fall under the second provision either. Jense, supra note 30, at 1833. So while the two-pronged approach towards reigning in "tax fraud" appears beneficial, a deeper look shows the problems with the system. Jense, supra note 30, at 1833. 89 At the time, it was estimated that US clients held about $18 to $20 billion in assets at UBS, 90 which is one of the largest financial institutions in the world. 91 Mr. Birkenfeld's startling testimony elaborated the extent to which UBS aided US citizens in evading taxes, such as smuggling diamonds into the United States in a tube of toothpaste.
92
In addition to being subject to the terms of the 2003 Agreement, UBS had also taken the additional step of entering into a Qualified Intermediary (QI) Agreement 93 with the IRS, which required it to identify and document any customers who held US investments or received US source income in their accounts.
94 So when Mr. Birkenfeld testified against UBS, the inability of both the government-mandated requirements from the 2003 Agreement and the further requirements of the voluntary QI Agreements exposed the considerable flaws in the US efforts to reign in offshore accounts in Switzerland. 95 Coinciding with the "great recession," the news of the number of wealthy Americans evading taxes struck a chord with the American public and produced a great deal of animosity.
96
The UBS debacle revealed that the promising language in the 2003 Agreement still suffered from the debilitating effects of Switzerland's strong banking privacy laws. Agreement are that it still excludes tax evasion short of "tax fraud" 97 and requires US officials to find the tax evader and obtain enough evidence to support a "reasonable suspicion" of tax fraud. 98 These inadequacies can be attributed to Switzerland's domestic interest in maintaining its strong banking privacy laws.
99
In order to address the inadequacies of the 2003 Agreement exposed by the UBS debacle, the United States and Switzerland negotiated a 2009 amendment.
100 This treaty has not been ratified by the US, 101 presumably because the United States has recognized the flaws in using bilateral treaties to rein in tax evasion. The bilateral treaty efforts by the United States in attempting to rein in offshore tax evasion have not been effective when it faces opposition from strong domestic laws such as Switzerland's.
102 These treaties have illustrated the need for compulsory reporting requirements on foreign banks in order to effectively curb tax evasion. 103 Unfortunately for the United States, the framework of international law does not lend itself to compulsory requirements on sovereign nations unless those nations voluntarily comply.
104 Because it will be nearly impossible for all countries to voluntarily comply with the disclosure requirements of the United States, 105 treaties are an inadequate mechanism for dealing with offshore tax evasion.
"Blacklisting"
With growing discontent over the ineffectiveness of bilateral treaties 97 While the international pressure did instigate a desire to get off the "blacklist" 115 the steps required for de-listing left much to be desired. In order for a country to get off the "blacklist" they were required to "make formal commitments to implement all the OECD's standards of transparency and exchange of information."
116 Using the Cayman Islands as an example, in order to comply with the "formal commitment" requirement, it sent the OECD a letter pledging to refrain from:
(1) introducing any new regime that would constitute a harmful tax practice under the OECD; (2) for any existing regime related to financial and other services that currently does not constitute a harmful tax practice under the OECD Report, modifying the regime in such a way that, after modifications, it would constitute a harmful tax practice under the OECD Report; and (3) These "commitments," even upon first glance, are no more than empty promises. What the Cayman Islands "promises" to do is to not increase its tax avoidance structure.
118 It is not promising to get rid of "harmful tax practices" or commit to reforming them, but just to stop their development or progression. Many of these countries, including the Cayman Islands, already have a developed system of "harmful tax practices"
119 which garnered them a spot on the list in the first place. So by telling these countries just not to go any further, it has almost no practical effect because they are already in a position where they have the practices in place and will gain little from expanding them. Without requiring any change in the currently existing "harmful tax practices," the OECD appears to be doing nothing more than officially listing common knowledge.
Towards the end of the prior decade, it became clear 120 that the use of bilateral treaties and "blacklisting" was ineffective in regulating offshore tax evasion, and a new solution was needed. 121 After years of negotiations 122 Congress decided upon a solution in 2010. 123 Instead of using bilateral and multinational treaties, the traditional tools of international law, Congress took a bold step in a new direction, promulgating a unilateral imposition of domestic law on foreign banks and companies. 119. An example of harmful tax practices includes the banking secrecy laws which put them on the OECD list in the first place.
120. With the limited practical effect of "blacklisting" as evidenced above, and the failures of the bilateral treaty system exposed by the UBS case, the state of tax-haven regulation was not effective. 140 The thought process is that by threatening foreign institutions where US citizens conceal their money to comply with IRS information reporting requirements, they will create an international withholding system similar to the one currently being used for US domestic income.
141
A. Definitions and Implementation of the Withholding Ultimatum to Compel Information Disclosure
Foreign Financial Institutions
The regulation of "foreign financial institutions" is of perhaps the 125 143 Under section 1471(a), any "withholdable payment" to a "foreign financial institution" that does not meet the reporting requirements of subsection (b) will have 30 percent of the payment deducted by a "withholding agent." 144 Thus, "foreign financial institutions" have a choice: face a 30 percent withholding tax on all "withholdable payments" or subject themselves to the reporting requirements of subsection (b). 145 As the withholding system provision demonstrates, the definitions for the operative FATCA terms are very important to the operation of the system, 146 and these definitions are broad so as to achieve the purpose of mandating a withholding regime. 147 To determine who falls under the withholding regulations of section 1471, there are three key terms which need to be defined: "foreign financial institution," "withholdable payment," and "withholding agent."
148
The term "foreign financial institution" is the gatekeeper definition, signaling to which institutions the withholding ultimatum applies.
"Financial institution" is defined as any entity that "accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business," or "as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account of others," or "is engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, partnerships interests, commodities, or any interest in such securities, partnership interests, or commodities." 150 Under section 1471(d)(4), the definition of "foreign financial institution" is further refined as "any financial institution which is a foreign entity." 151 Through these definitions, "foreign financial institutions" are broadly defined 152 so as to include all foreign owned institutions that are involved in financial business. 153 This definition includes banks, investment firms, hedge funds, and even any entity which "hold[s] itself out as being engaged" primarily in 
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the business of investing 154 in order to encompass almost all institutions that could aid a US citizen to avoid income taxes under the breadth of FATCA.
155
The next step in the definitional framework is to find out what "withholdable payments" of the "foreign financial institutions" will be subject to the 30 percent withholding. Section 1473(1)(A) defines "withholdable payment" as any payment of interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, if such payment is from sources within the United States . . . [and] any gross proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any property of a type which can produce interest or dividends from sources within the United States. 156 Again, this definition is broad so as to include almost any type of monetary transfer on which foreign financial institutions depend for their business.
157 These withholdable payments are so broad that some industry experts have advised that "as soon as you invest in the US, you are in [the regulation's] scope."
158
The final key definition in the withholding scheme is for "withholding agents."
159 These agents are defined as "all persons, in whatever capacity acting, having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of any withholdable payment." 160 Designed to implement the withholding at an intermediary level before the funds exit the country, 161 the duty will most likely fall to US financial industry counterparts who oversee the transactions that lead to the foreign institutions obtaining the source income. The wording of these "withholding agents" as "all persons" in "whatever capacity" follows along with the broad definitions located in the other sections, designed to encompass all those who will be able to 154 withhold a portion of the income. 162 With these broad definitions, the drafters of FATCA succeeded in their purpose of creating a large enough net to compel the foreign institutions that aid US citizens in avoiding tax reporting to comply with the FATCA reporting requirements. 163 
Beneficial Ownership of Foreign Companies
In addition to applying to "foreign financial institutions," FATCA, through section 1472, extends its reach to foreign companies who have a US citizen as a "substantial" owner. 164 Borrowing the definitions contained in the other areas of FATCA, section 1472 applies to any "withholdable payment" made to a "non-financial foreign entity."
165 "Non-financial foreign entity" is defined literally to mean a foreign entity that is not a financial institution.
166 Section 1472 also revolves around an ultimatum provision: subject to the reporting requirements or face a 30 percent withholding tax on all "withholdable payments." 167 The term "substantial United States owner" is the key phrase when dealing with non-financial foreign entities, and is defined in section 1473(2).
168 Under section 1473(2), a "substantial United States owner" means with respect to any corporation, partnership, or trust, "any specified United States person which owns, directly or indirectly, more than 10 percent" of the stock in the corporation, or percent of the profit or capital interests in such partnership, or beneficial interests of such trust. 169 Furthermore, if the entity is a financial institution engaged primarily in the business of investing or trading in securities and the like, the 10 percent requirement is placed aside in favor of a 0 percent ownership requirement. 
Information Disclosure Agreements
The alternative to the 30 percent withholding for "foreign financial institutions" under section 1471 and "non-financial foreign entities" under section 1472 is to enter into an Information Disclosure Agreement. 
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which a "foreign financial institution" must comply. 172 In order to comply, a "foreign financial institution" must enter into an agreement with the IRS under which the institution agrees to:
Obtain such information regarding each holder of each account maintained by such institution as is necessary to determine which (if any) of such accounts are United States accounts, to comply with such verification and due diligence procedures as the Secretary may require with respect to the identification of United States accounts . . .
[and] to comply with requests by the Secretary for additional information with respect to any United States account maintained by such institution.
173
"United States accounts," which the reporting requirements seek to discover, are defined as "any financial account which is held by one or more specified United States persons or United States owned foreign entities."
174
If an entity makes a reporting agreement with the IRS under subsection (b) as outlined above, it will be required to institute a system that will allow it to separate its clients based on US and non-US citizenship.
175
For all US accountholders, the financial institution will have to report the following information:
The name, address, and TIN [Taxpayer Identification Number] of each account holder which is a specified United States person and, in the case of any account holder which is a United States owned foreign entity, the name, address, and TIN of each substantial United States owner of such entity; the account number; the account balance or value; and except to the extent provided by the Secretary, the gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the account.
176
To implement the type of recording required by the FATCA provisions, most financial institutions are projecting a large cost increase 177 which will most likely be passed on to their customers. [Vol. 24:3
In addition to the costs of complying with the disclosure requirements, there is the potential for foreign entities to be subjected to potential lawsuits and fines. 179 One thing to keep in mind with these FATCA statutes is that they are US domestic laws which attempt to bind foreign entities who engage in business within the United States. 180 Because this applies to foreign entities, the drafters included section 1471(b)(1)(F) to provide that in regards to a financial institution:
[A]ny case in which any foreign law would . . . prevent the reporting of any information referred to in this subsection or subsection (c) with respect to any United States account maintained by such institution: to attempt to obtain a valid and effective waiver of such law from each holder of such account, and if a waiver . . . is not obtained from each such holder within a reasonable period of time, to close such account.
181
Designed to tackle banking secrecy laws head-on, 182 this provision allows entities that enter into disclosure agreements to circumvent their domestic laws.
183 While the United States may not favor the banking secrecy laws of foreign nations, they are still the laws of those foreign nations, and asking an entity to violate its domestic laws for the sake of an agreement with a foreign government is a highly questionable practice. For Swiss banks, violations of banking secrecy laws have led to bankers getting their licenses removed, fines, and even imprisonment.
184
With the potential for negative legal effects in their home countries, 185 and a large cost with complying, the disclosure agreements are a strenuous requirement upon foreign institutions. Asking banks as large as UBS to identify and classify their customers based on US citizenship versus non-US citizenship, FATCA is quite an imposition. 179. In several of these countries, such as Switzerland, the domestic laws prevent a bank from disclosing customer information, and could lead to criminal penalties within Switzerland. 
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Passthru Payments
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the FATCA reporting requirements is in regards to "passthru payments."
186 "Passthru payments" are defined as "any withholdable payment or other payment to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment" 187 and are utilized within the structure of the regulations as a stop-gap prevention against one of the more obvious loopholes.
188
Under section 1471(b)(1)(D), a foreign financial institution that enters into a reporting agreement with the IRS must also deduct and withhold a 30 percent tax on any "passthru payment" made by such institution to a "recalcitrant account holder" or another foreign financial institution which has not entered into an agreement with the IRS.
189 "Recalcitrant account holders" are account holders in the financial institution who fail to comply with requests for information or fail to provide the foreign law waiver.
190
The passthru payment provision mandates a foreign financial institution to withhold money that is not its own. This includes money that belongs to individuals who do not fully disclose who they are or waive their rights under their domestic law, as well as money belonging to another financial entity who for whatever reason has decided not to comply with the FATCA regulations. 191 The IRS has recognized both the difficulty in implementing this part of the FATCA system, as well as the negative comments received from the financial industry, and as a result has pushed back the implementation of "passthru payment" regulation until 2017. [Vol. 24:3 foreign entities. 194 Although the FATCA supporters within the US government have charged forward headstrong in their resolve, they do appear cognizant of how other countries might negatively perceive this system. 195 As a result, there has been a recent push by the US government to compel compliance through another route: bilateral treaties.
196
Claiming that these treaties minimize the burden upon foreign entities, 197 while facilitating coordination with local law restrictions 198 and improving collaboration with foreign governments, 199 the IRS and Treasury Department view this as a powerful tool in their arsenal. 200 Similar to the bilateral treaties that have been relied upon in the past, 201 these treaties allow a foreign financial institution located in a FATCA partner country an alternative means of complying with the requirements.
202
There are two types of these intergovernmental agreements that the IRS has been using. 203 The first type is a hybrid between the bilateral tax information exchange agreements and the reporting requirements of FATCA, where a partner country agrees through a treaty to pass domestic legislation implementing FATCA's provisions. 204 With this domestic legislation, those entities subject to FATCA reporting will send the information to their countries' tax authorities, who in turn will exchange the information with the United States under the existing framework of tax information exchange agreements.
205
The second type of intergovernmental agreement does not mandate legislation in the partner country to implement the collection of information and taxes, but merely requires the partner country not to impede the IRS in The prevalence of these negotiations within the past two years, 213 and the comments of the treasury 214 indicate an increasing focus on implementing FATCA bilaterally through agreements with other countries, rather than unilaterally through US law. 215 As the introduction of the agreement with the United Kingdom indicates, international tax evasion is not just a problem for the United States, and the underlying policy goals of FATCA reporting requirements to improve tax compliance is important to other countries as well. 216 So while the use of intergovernmental agreements is primarily for the purpose of addressing legal impediments of implementing the domestic law of the United States upon foreign entities, it also serves the purpose of putting forth a multinational effort to reign in tax 206 According to the father of collective action theory, 229 Mancur Olson, the only way to overcome this problem is to provide external influences, either in the form of subsidies or penalties, to herd individuals into compliance for the benefit of the community. 230 In the domestic tax sphere, the US government has circumvented this problem entirely through the employer withholding system, and is attempting to do the same in the international realm with FATCA. 231 So what occurs when the decision is left to the individual? When an individual examines whether or not to comply with the external influences in the tax system, i.e. audit risk and underpayment penalties, he or she can be understood to be engaging in a modified prisoner's dilemma. 232 One element of the decision is the theory of "signaling" posited by Eric Posner. 233 Signaling is based on an assumption that society consists of a great deal of cooperative relationships, each of which has the structure of a repeated prisoner's dilemma. 234 Based on the existence of this web of repeated prisoner's dilemmas, an individual has the choice in each one whether to cooperate or cheat, and "players may refrain from cheating in the hope that they will develop a reputation for not cheating-both within 228 If you betray your colleague and he is loyal to you, you will get a benefit of eight (say a good plea bargain). And if one prisoner is loyal and his colleague betrays him, he will get no benefit (the other prisoner gets the benefit). Each prisoner also knows that if he is loyal and his colleague is also loyal, they each get a benefit of five. However, if both prisoners betray one another, they both get a benefit of only two. . . . The best strategy would be for both prisoners to be loyal. Yet under the circumstances of the prisoner's dilemma game, each prisoner acting separately will tend to betray the other. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 382, 389-90 (1993) (alteration added). Professor Eskridge further explains: "Acting rationally but not knowing what B will do, A faces possible benefits of two or eight if he betrays, but only zero or five, respectively, if he does not betray. Given such a choice, A will betray. B will also betray under the same reasoning." Id. at 390, n.29. Public goods games can be conceived of as prisoner's dilemma games because each player's rational move is not to contribute, but total welfare is maximized if all players contribute. The key to understanding the prior conflict of the offshore bank account problem is that those individuals were not located within the community envisioned by Olson and Posner. Their choice to place assets outside of the detection and reach of the withholding system is a loophole that allows the individual to maximize wealth potential while avoiding the negative "signaling" associated with individual-motivated actions. 236 The FATCA regime tries to extend the domestic taxation system, forcing individuals into a withholding system 237 with the risk of receiving negative signaling consequences. 238 The success of the domestic tax collection system, which FATCA is attempting to replicate in the international realm, is predicated on the successful application of withholding to those offshore tax evaders.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. International Relation Implications
Even with the recent focus by the United States on intergovernmental agreements with other countries to implement the reporting requirements, FATCA is still a stark departure from previous international law precedent. 240 Most of the treaties and agreements that constitute international law have relied upon non-binding, vague language to effectuate broader policy goals.
241
Whether through multinational organizations, or bilateral treaties, the power of a given agreement is limited to the power an individual sovereign nation is willing to give up. 242 235. Posner, supra note 218, at 1786. 236. Posner, supra note 218, at 1786. 237. 26 U.S.C. § 1471 (2010). 238. Posner, supra note 218, at 1816. 239. Through the broad definitions, FATCA seeks to come as close as practically possible to the domestic system's universal application of withholding, although it will inevitably fall short because the definitions are predicated on the foreign entities caring about doing business within the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 1471.
240. See supra Part II for a discussion of the reliance on ineffective bilateral and multinational treaties.
241. For example, see the language used in the OECD commitment letter for the Cayman Islands, where the Government of the Cayman Islands "commits to refrain from…introducing any new regime that would constitute a harmful tax practice….strengthening or extending the scope of any existing measures that currently constitute a harmful tax practice." Commitment Letter, supra note 117. These commitments basically amount to promises not to expand an already thriving tax haven, and as such are vague and lack true reform. In the realm of international relations, the fear of surrendering too much sovereignty often has to be balanced with pressures from other countries. The quintessential example of international pressure comes from the Cold War exploits of the United States and the USSR, where both countries sought influence across the globe. 243 There is a fine line in international relations between preserving sovereignty on the one hand and keeping up good international relations on the other. As a result of the tightrope that must be walked between the two, it is only logical that most countries do not appreciate another that asks too frequently for sovereignty concessions and for too much advantage through international agreements. Understandably, the international community does not appreciate an actor who unilaterally imposes its will onto other countries to effectuate domestic policies. This unilateral imposition is a complete disregard for the sovereignty of the foreign nation and thus a disregard for international relations as a whole.
In the past decade, the United States has found out the hard way that unilateral imposition on another nation's sovereignty, even for a beneficial reason, damages a country's international reputation if the proper protocols are not followed. 244 In order for international law and order to work, it has to apply uniformly to all parties involved, and all states must respect the sovereignty of other states. While the old, pre-WWII system of international relations would allow unilateral impositions upon another state's sovereignty, 245 the multinational system of cooperation in today's world requires something different.
In this system of international relations, FATCA sticks out like a sore thumb and a relic of old. The very concept of FATCA is for a unilateral imposition of US domestic policy onto entities located in foreign sovereign states. 246 While the trend towards intergovernmental agreements reduces the brazenness of this move, the agreements are still the same exact implementation of US domestic law. 247 As a country coming to the negotiating table with the United States, you have three options. First, you could enter into an agreement with the United States; 248 second, you could not enter into an agreement and have the United States implement its laws onto your financial institutions anyway; 249 or third, you could inform your examined their situations and determined that the best decision for them is to keep their money offshore and accept the risk that the United States may find them. FATCA attempts to rein these ardent avoiders in by taking away their banks. And although FATCA has a broad reach, its problem is that it is not universal. When there is a demand for a service such as international tax avoidance, the only way to combat it effectively is make it as close to universally illegal as possible. By increasing the breadth and scope of international tax law to the point where tax avoiders cannot hide their money by staying one step ahead of the United States and switching banks, the government will be in the best position to control the market and lessen the demand. 293 FATCA, however, is not so broad, 294 and thus instead of eliminating the market for offshore "havens," it will merely push it elsewhere.
Historically the demand for offshore "havens" have been mostly filled by medium to large sized reputable banks located in countries with strong privacy laws such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and the like. 295 Most of these banks have become the choice of many US citizens because their size affords a convenience-the banks usually deal heavily within the United States and often have offices in the country. 296 FATCA is designed to target these larger banks directly, 297 and other banks within developed nations are "compelled" to enter into intergovernmental agreements to implement FATCA themselves.
298
By taking away the larger, reputable banks in well-developed countries, FATCA pushes the markets into areas where the financial institutions do not regularly deal in US "source income" and are not overly persuaded to give up domestic sovereignty if the United States flexes its muscle. 299 These are the locations where FATCA cannot reach, and where the money will find its way.
The implications of this shift are troubling. The countries in the world that do not routinely do business with the United States or do not care about its influence are those which are often the most dangerous countries. The problem with trying to avoid the watching eye of the US government for tax purposes is that it pushes tax evasion to the same places that terrorists, drug cartels, and other black market individuals also must go. [Vol. 24:3
Perhaps the most concerning country that this market could move to is China. As of October 2012, China owned $1.2 trillion in US Treasury bonds, or 10 percent of the US national debt, 300 and has become a very important trading partner. 301 If China wanted to use its political sway to take advantage of creating a market for international tax avoiders, it is unlikely that anyone would be able to stop it.
Because the tax avoiders left in the offshore arena are there for their own financial reasons, it is unlikely that FATCA will force compliance. So while FATCA is recognized by some as a success, 302 that success is only short-term, as a result of capturing the funds of the non-ardent avoiders. When taken to its logical end, FATCA will push funds into the hands of dangerous people and unreliable institutions in dangerous countries. 303 
B. What Should Be Done?
While the philosophical discussion over which motivational tool works better-the stick or the carrot-has been a well-documented contest, 304 the determination is predominantly dependent on the facts of a given scenario. Due to the surrounding facts or background information, some situations call for more stick than carrot or vice versa. The background information of the person involved sets the scene for how they can be expected to perceive and react to the motivation. By examining the facts of a given situation, the motivator must then decide which of the very different techniques he should use to achieve his goals.
The principal benefit of using a stick to motivate an individual is deterrence. 305 By imposing strict and daunting penalties, and using those penalties to threaten individuals into action, they are motivated not to be
